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Stability is a central component in the operation of the international system. 
Reflecting its necessity, the principles of territorial integrity and state sovereignty are 
deeply engrained in international law. Secession challenges these tenets through the right 
to self-determination. However, the right to self-determination is not a generalized right 
to secede, and secession remains a rare occurrence. This has held uniquely true to Africa, 
where colonialism left a legacy of non-viable states and ripe conditions for secession, yet 
South Sudan and Eritrea have been the only cases in the half of a century since 
decolonization. Existing research on secession has primarily sought to understand where 
it occurs and why. A deficit in the literature of secession exists as to what differentiates 
successful cases of secession from failures.  
Drawing local, regional and international factors of significance from case study 
analysis of Eritrea, South Sudan, Katanga, Biafra and Somaliland, this research finds that 
the presence of high-intensity, long duration civil war that generates regional instability 
strongly correlates with the outcome of a secession. The presence of physical or material 
resources does not necessarily enhance the viability of a secession, and the strength of a 
separatist legal claim as well as their fulfillment of the qualifications of statehood are 
dependent on other factors. 
Introduction 
 Stability is central to the existence of the international state system, and the 
framework of international law reflects this (Shaw 443–4). The need for stability is 
reflected in formal international legislation, and in the existence of international regimes 
on issues of border alteration, state recognition, and the destruction of states (Krasner 
185–205). In addition, the majority of domestic and international case law sets 
sovereignty and territorial integrity above self-determination (Shaw 444–5, 449). The 
principles of state sovereignty and territorial integrity form the structural foundation of 
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that stability. These principles protect the status quo by institutionalizing the permanence 
of existing states, thereby discouraging separatism within states and rejecting the 
potential for annexation by other states (390–1; Jackson 23).1 However, these deeply 
rooted aspects of the international system conflict with the right to self-determination and 
the broader regime on human rights (Shaw 443). Though the implications of this conflict 
remain a point of contention, its existence represents a diversification of the means that 
actors in the international system believe are necessary to achieve stability, security, and 
power (Shaw 1036). 
The end of the Cold War marked a shift from the broad challenges of nuclear 
warfare and proxy conflicts to delicate issues of state failure, ethnic and sectarian 
violence, and trans-national terrorism. Conventional solutions to communal conflict such 
as sanctions, economic and humanitarian aid, and peacekeeping interventions have 
proven to be only marginally effective and generally come at significant cost. As a result, 
alternative methods of resolution, such as secession, have taken a more prominent 
position among scholars and policy makers (Johnson 140–1, 143). Unsurprisingly, the 
discourse on secession has failed to translate into accepted practice. International laws 
and norms regarding state sovereignty and territorial integrity makes secession a rare 
occurrence in the international system (143, 148, 165).2 Nevertheless, amidst an 
interconnected international economy and concern for human rights, the destabilizing 
effects of internal conflicts as well as fears of providing bases for terrorism have ensured 
that secession remains a possibility.3 When it does occur, cases of secession offer unique 
insight into the framework of the international system and its components because they 
take place at a crossroads between local, regional and international actors, laws, regimes, 
and interests.  
 Compared to other regions of the world, Sub-Saharan Africa has witnessed high 
levels of post-decolonization political violence (Gleditsch 616). This violence can be 
attributed to a colonial history that left African states with weak government institutions, 
                                                
1 By state sovereignty, I am referring to negative state sovereignty, or the freedom from outside interference 
and intervention. Further, I acknowledge that this principle is far from inviolable, or in other words always 
obeyed, however its existence does limit both the extent of such interference, and the necessary level of 
power a state must possess to undermine or ignore the sovereignty of another state.  
2 Secession briefly became quite common in the 1990s when the Soviet Union Disintegrated.  
3 Ibid. 
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arbitrary borders, and undiversified commodity driven economies that are conducive to 
fueling conflict. These traits strongly correlate with separatism, which has led predictive 
models to regard Sub-Saharan Africa as uniquely prone to secession (Englebert, Hummel 
403).  
In contrast to these expectations, empirical analysis demonstrates Sub-Saharan 
Africa to have a deficit of secession (403). In the 56 years since the start of 
decolonization, there have only been two successful secessions in Sub-Saharan Africa: 
that of Eritrea in 1994, and South Sudan in 2011. Existing research has explored this 
deficit and the two exceptions in the interest of understanding why separatist sentiment 
arises where it does (403; Hannum, Babbitt 3). However, the current literature has failed 
to address the question as to what differentiates Eritrea and South Sudan from other 
major cases of separatism in Africa, such as Biafra in Nigeria, Katanga in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, and Somaliland in Somalia. 
 Recognizing the importance of secession and the opportunity it affords to learn 
about the international system, this thesis seeks to address this question. Case study 
analysis of Eritrea, South Sudan, Katanga, Biafra, and Somaliland is employed to identify 
significant local, regional, and international factors that serve as determinants in the 
outcome of a secession. This thesis finds that high-intensity, long duration civil wars that 
generate external instability have the strongest positive correlation with the outcome of a 
secessionist movement. Research also indicates that the presence of geographical 
resources or commodities do not necessarily enhance the viability of a secession, which 
disputes existing theoretical work on the connection between resources and secession. 
Likewise, the strength of the legal claim of a secessionist movement and their fulfillment 
of the qualifications of statehood do not necessarily boost the viability of a secession. The 
impact of these factors may be significant but are dependent on other factors.  
The fate of a secession is ultimately dependent on the decision of existing states 
as to whether or not extend recognition. As recognition of a secession leaves the 
recognizing state vulnerable to external consequences (unless the host state has already 
dissolved or agreed to the secession) and internal consequences, the cost of inaction must 
outweigh the potential price of recognition.  
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Understanding Secession  
  Secession is a process aimed at creating a new sovereign state on territory 
internationally recognized as forming part of an existing state (Englebert, Hummel; 
Radan 20). The process of secession is completed with the acquisition of sufficient 
official international recognition as a sovereign state, and the obtainment of membership 
as such in the United Nations (Englebert, Hummel 403; Radan 20). U.N. membership is 
necessary to ensure the juridical sovereignty of a state, without which the secession 
remains vulnerable to elimination by the host state.4 
What Motivates Secession?  
 Discourse on the motivations behind secession can be divided into two 
interrelated categories: overarching arguments as to the decision-making structure of a 
secession, and substantive motivational factors. Opportunity structures, also known as 
rational-choice models, dominate the majority of explanatory literature, which 
conceptualizes nationalism and secessionist movements as constructs of cost-benefit 
analysis by rational actors (Pavkovic, Radan 41–2). For example, Paul Collier and Anne 
Hoeffler argue that secession is driven by economic gains, and that violations of human 
rights do not play a significant role (Hannum, Babbitt 3). A small portion of the literature 
asserts that non-quantifiable factors that are discounted by opportunity structures, such as 
history and culture, contribute to the probability of secession (Pavkovic, Radan 42). They 
argue that existing opportunity models fail to account for the capacity of individuals to 
diverge from the group (42, 48). They also believe that factors external to a conflict may 
alter the cost-benefit analysis of the actors involved, such as technological advancements 
or shifts in the values of the international system (42, 48).  
The rational choice model holds obvious weight for understanding secession. 
However, individuals are not entirely rational actors. Their perspectives, and thus the 
elements analyzed in a cost-benefit analysis, are not limited to those that are quantifiable. 
Considered in this way, and because quantifiable and non-quantifiable factors do not 
                                                
4 Given this, secession as a method of state creation favors the Constitutive Theory of state recognition. 
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inherently conflict, I propose an alternative superstructure that takes opportunity 
structures, non-quantifiable factors, and external shifts into account.5  
As with any other situation where a group is involved in a conflict or dispute, two 
potentially separate but interactive mechanisms are at work: an organizing factor and a 
mobilizing factor (Pavlovic, Radan 42; Englebert, Hummel 403). This does not discredit 
existing research, but instead provides a simplified structure through which concepts may 
be applied and examined (42; 403). The structure of any secession may be analyzed 
through identifying one or more elements that could serve as one or both of these factors, 
and may be broadly categorized into four bases:  
1) Identity 
2) Resources and Sovereignty 
3) State Policies and Behavior 
4) Viability Modifiers 
Each of these factors may serve as both the organizer and motivator of a secession 
movement, however in most cases a dynamic relationship exists between them. Factors 
may reinforce one another, and the motivations behind secession may shift over time. 
This can occur for a variety of reasons, for example in reaction to the positions of 
existing states, or if a Diaspora or other another external support base is involved. Such 
groups may offer a distorted or fictional explanation to justify further support for the 
conflict.  
Identity and Secession 
Relevant literature on the construction and manipulation of identity is centered on 
the concept that ethnic and national identities are endogenous to “social phenomena such 
as mass politics and capitalism, both in how and when they were created and in the nature 
of their existence” (Green 4). As Elliot Green highlights in his work “On the Endogeneity 
of Ethnic Secessionist Groups,” there are two schools of thought regarding the way in 
which ethnically motivated political action may function: the elitist and the mass (5). The 
work of Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler and others represent the elitist school, which asserts 
that elites manipulate concepts of ethnicity, creating and shaping feuds and hatreds that 
                                                
5 The idea behind the need for this structure was to open the cost-benefit analysis theories to external 
factors within the scope of this paper. I grant that this may be considered unnecessary, or irrelevant, as such 
a structure may already exist in an alternate form. 
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shape the groups themselves (5). In contrast, the mass school “ascribes power to all 
members of a given ethnic group, who collectively choose to associate based on the 
material benefits they can potentially possess as a group” (Bates 152–171). 
In either case, individuals possess a repertoire of potential identities that they can 
utilize, and through which others attempt to appeal to them, depending on the situation 
(Posner 2). The basis for identity as an interactive variable lies with the principles of 
identity construction and identity choice (2). Identity construction defines the array of 
political identities that may be mobilized within a society (2). Sub-national, national, and 
international markets, events, and political institutions determine traits that are viable for 
mobilization (2). 6 These elements create the bases of identity by shaping the competitive 
arena as well as the incentives for individuals to participate. These choices achieve 
society-wide impact as individuals coordinate their decisions in response to these bases 
(3). 
The array of identity options available to an individual depends on their 
background and the dynamics that determine their political saliency. Individuals then 
utilize those identities that they believe best enable them to achieve their goals (Posner 
2). The fault lines of identity that emerge then represent an aggregation of individuals’ 
decisions as to what coalition will be the most political and economically beneficial to 
join or create (2–3). Benefits are not solely positive in nature; people may align 
themselves with one another for the purpose of protection or the mitigation of detrimental 
policies and events. In other words, identity operates as an organizing factor for secession 
in the pursuit of positive benefits, and economic and political incentives operate as 
factors of motivation. On the other hand, identity may operate as both the point of 
organization and motivation where negative benefits, like protection and survival are 
concerned (the notions of positive and negative are the same as those used with aspects of 
state sovereignty). 
 Understanding the structure and operation of identity coalitions is important to 
understanding secession. When individuals are unable to manipulate their situation to 
obtain access to the resources, power, and protection of the sovereign state, or are 
                                                
6 Theoretically any characteristic could serve as a viable identity basis for mobilization; however, in 
practice greater variation among those possessing such traits effectively rules out more minor features, such 
as hair color or favorite colors. 
6
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otherwise unable to participate in or protect against the government, they may seek to 
secede. This may be in part due to the way in which identity can modify the cost-benefit 
analysis of a potential or ongoing secessionist campaign. Notions of ethnic or religious 
solidarity give support to separatists through Diasporas, and other state and non-state 
actors. Such groups may contribute to secessionist sentiment and fuel the conflict, as 
“they tend to keep grievances alive, offer irredentist support, magnify beliefs in ethnic 
purity, and provide funding to local organizations” (Englebert, Hummel 404). For 
example, the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka and government of Somaliland have received 
significant support from their respective Diasporas (404).  
Ethnicity, Ideology and Regionalism 
 Ethnicity and ideology have dynamic relationships with processes of identity 
formation. Nationalist sentiment may be built upon one or both of these, or it may 
conflict with them. In relation to secessionist movements, the two may be distinct or 
overlap as unifying factors. For example, in South Sudan, concepts of blackness aligned 
with Christianity and Animism within a number of different separatist groups (Hannum 
308–9). However, regionalism can serve as another basis for identity, as the case of 
Eritrea demonstrates (Pavkovic, Radan 497). 
By nature of their mechanics, ethnicity, ideology, and regionalism differ in effect 
as the foundations of secessionist movements. Ethnicity provides a strong basis for 
separatist movements, as it is perceived to be relatively exclusive. Similarities in 
language, culture, history, and more importantly the way in which others perceive and 
interact with potential members of an ethnic group, make it a prudent base for 
secessionist claims. Concepts of ethnic unity and purity, which may be utilized by people 
on the ground, or by members of a Diaspora, encourage the construction of support 
networks (Posner 3). 
Ideology, particularly religion, being more expansive and inclusive lacks the 
rallying strength of ethnicity or culture. That being said, ideology may motivate 
secessionist movements by garnering external support from states and non-state actors 
such as religious institutions. Ideology may also skew the cost-benefit analysis of 
potential separatists, given the intangible elements involved.  
7
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Regionalism is a form of Segmentary Opposition, and exists as a reactionary sub-
nationalist identity (Barth 5).7 Though not necessarily possessing the unifying strength of 
ethnicity and the support networks of religion, regionalism represents a critical basis for 
mobilization as it presents fewer points of internal dispute amongst separatists. 
Regionalism represents a form of opposition coalescence, which develops when common 
opposition to a group or entity induces the alignment of multiple identities to form a new 
base. This may also occur among ideological and ethnic identities. 
Resources and Sovereignty8 
Economic incentives and material benefits are generally regarded as the dominant 
determinants and explanations of civil war and secession (Hannum, Babbitt 4; Englebert, 
Hummel 404). Existing research has shown a strong correlation between the presence of 
natural resources and instances of separatism (Ross 337–8). This work has produced a 
range of explanations for this relationship; however, they tend to center on the control of 
resources as a motivation for two groups: coalitions that would benefit from a secession 
and the existing sovereign state (337–8). When a region or group considers itself 
economically disadvantaged by its relations with the sovereign state, it may “reassess the 
relative costs and benefits of belonging to a national union, and in turn contemplate 
seceding” (Bookman 39). Interestingly, such a conclusion is not unique to regions that 
may be considered rich or poor (39). 
 The opportunity to control and profit from natural resources offers a strong 
incentive for local actors, though their course of action may depend on the type of 
resources. Resources are not limited to material goods, alternatives such as coastal 
access, or state sovereignty may also be viewed as desirable to control (39). Groups may 
launch a secessionist movement if they are not being provided sufficient services or 
benefits by the central government and seceding would allow them to create or retain 
necessary agricultural and material goods (Englebert). Where a group or region is 
deprived of their autonomy and authority, they may be motivated to secede to reacquire 
                                                
7 Segmentary Opposition refers to the tendency of groups to put aside their own conflicts and ally when 
faxing a greater external threat. 
8 I base my perspective of natural resources on the broad definition used by Michael Ross in his work 
“Natural Resources and Civil War,” pg. 19. These include oil, gas, precious stones, non-fuel minerals, 
lumber, agricultural commodities and drugs.  
8
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their power in a new state or force concessions by the central government (Hannum, 
Babbitt 3). 
Resources requiring significant infrastructure development, stability, and foreign 
investment, such as oil, are more likely to motivate secessionist movements (Englebert, 
Hummel 405). As the central government is capable of contesting agreements within its 
territory, local actors desire sovereignty of their own (405). 9 In contrast, resources that 
require little to no capital or foreign infrastructure and investment, such as diamonds, do 
not require sovereignty to be extracted. In these cases, local actors back a local power, 
rather than trying to secede (405; Nabudere 296).10 
Sovereignty is an incentive in and of itself. Sovereign states can receive 
development, food, arms aid, loans, and they have a domestic monopoly on violence. 
Beyond these positive incentives, seceding states that leave a rump state behind tend to 
emerge without the burden of debt, though that depends on the circumstances and 
investments in the area seceding. That being said, where natural resources converge with 
these considerations (potentially offering a means by which groups may fund opposition) 
there is an increased change of foreign support and intervention (405; Hannum, Babbitt 
34). 
 State Policies and Behavior 
On a passive level, the condition of a state has the potential to motivate or 
discourage a secessionist movement (Englebert, Hummel 406). The style of government 
is less important than whether or not a state is able to combat a separatist movement. 
Similarly, levels of political change or democratic institutions only matter in how they 
affect the strength of the state. Weak or dysfunctional states may motivate secessionist 
movements as groups seek to provide themselves with services that the state has failed to 
provide. Somaliland is one such example, though it was initially a distinct state and 
                                                
9The perceived necessity for local sovereignty is due in part to the ability of the existing sovereign 
government to oppose any such development or contracts, as well as the limitations of significant 
development aid and governmental business entities regarding dealings with non-states. 
10It should be noted that in dealing with resources that are easily extracted and transported, it is plausible 
that state policies and behavior may incline the people to seek to secede, though this may be counter-acted 
in both cases by directly dealing with corporations and side- stepping the central or regional government. 
An example of such behavior is found in the eastern provinces of the D.R.C. where various mining 
companies such as Anglo-American and Banro-Gold have bartered with local populations and on-site 
rebels to have access to mining sites and mineral rights. 
9
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represents a relatively unique case (Paquin 153). Weak or dysfunctional states rely more 
heavily on political violence, which may spill over into secessionist sentiment if 
grievances are created in the process. States in transition, which are not necessarily weak 
or dysfunctional, also may also provide the impetus for secession, as periods of 
democratization and economic transition have an impact on identity dynamics and may 
intensify identities, and in the process heighten security dilemmas (Englebert, Hummel 
406). 
The state actively constructs the cost-benefit analysis for potential separatists, as it 
is able to influence which identity elements are relevant or politically viable. The 
usefulness of any potential or existing coalition depends on the boundaries and identity 
bases of the political arena. Policy shifts among state institutions alter these bases and the 
shape of the political arena, and change the fault lines of identity. More directly, the state 
is capable of creating or nullifying grievances amongst the population through its actions 
and policies. These policies may be entirely politically aimed, such as the exclusion of a 
region or group to solidify a base of power, though they have also been found to overlap 
with the location of natural resources (Ross 34). In cases where valuable natural 
resources reside in an outlying region of a country or where a relative minority exists, 
states may engage in ‘pre-emptive repression’, or rather, campaigns of terror and 
suppression (34).11 
Viability Modifiers 
 Shifts at the system level, be it regional or international, alter the conditions of 
possibility for secession. In other words, factors and events beyond the immediate context 
of a potential secessionist effort impact the viability of an effort and the cost-benefit 
analysis of a group considering separatism. I define these as ‘Viability Modifiers.’ A 
viability modifier is any domestic, regional, or international factor that impacts the cost-
benefit analysis of a potential or existing separatist group. Thus, the judgment of a state 
and a separatist movement may shift over time and take changes in the international 
system into account.  
                                                
11The research of Michael Ross has shown such antagonistic activities and behavior to be relatively unique 
to combating separatist efforts. 
10
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 A Viability Modifier may be separate from the previously listed factors, or may 
represent a shift among them; for example, the price of a commodity in the international 
market. Broadly speaking though, Viability Modifiers encompass everything from market 
prices to shifts in norms and regimes relevant to secession: the right to self-determination, 
territorial integrity, positions on partition and secession as policy options, and others. For 
example, when the army in Mali launched a coup against the government, this was a 
Viability Modifier for separatists in the northern part of the country, who announced their 
independence and the creation of Azawad (Palus). 
 Differentiating these factors and understanding how they interact with one another 
is critical to a broader discussion of secession. This is in part due to the deficit of material 
on the subject. More importantly, understanding how factors can interact allows a more 
thorough examination and analysis of different cases of secession. The ability to 
recognize the organization and motivation factors of a secession is necessary to enable a 
better understanding of how internal and external actors interact and why. 
Why Africa: Africa as a Unique Setting for Secession 
 Africa is a unique setting for the study of secession, and the exploration and 
identification of significant factors involved in determining the outcome of secessionist 
efforts. As a region, Africa has a distinct relationship with secession, one that rests with 
the nature and processes of African state formation, as well as the contemporary 
conditions and characteristics of African states. 
On the Nature of African State: Common Sense Secession  
 International state borders are the recognized delimitations of states’ sovereignty 
and territory, as well as the area over which states are expected to exercise effective 
control (Okhonmina 177–179). States maintain a dynamic relationship with their borders, 
where the capacity of the state impacts the implications of its borders, yet its borders in 
part determine the capacity of a state. However, state formation and territorial 
consolidation have not been a uniform process throughout the world, and borders in 
different regions have differing implications and effects. 
 The contemporary borders of African states exemplify this point, as they follow 
the administrative boundaries of the European Colonial powers and which were 
transformed into international borders through the principle of Uti Possidetis during 
11
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decolonization (Ratner 595). These boundaries were designed arbitrarily in relation to the 
reality on the ground, being drawn with the simplest methods to reduce conflict among 
the European powers, without concern for demographic, geographic, or ethnographic 
factors, or the construction of viable states (Herbst 25). In some cases nascent power 
balances that had developed under colonial rule were disrupted as administrative zones 
and were either absorbed or consolidated. As such, this change left them severely 
disadvantaged within their new area and generally excluded from participation in 
discussions and decision-making during decolonization (effectively denying them 
independence). South Sudan and Cabinda are both examples of this practice (Southall 
156, 158).  
Decolonization raised the question as to whether the colonial borders should be 
restructured in an effort to resolve their arbitrary basis. However, participating African 
elites opted to maintain their respective borders as they were laid out prior to 
independence (Ratner 595). African leaders argued that opening the borders up to 
question could lead to violent and destabilizing conflict. European states backed this 
decision as it allowed them to rapidly depart with little obligation to arbitrate or mediate 
between different groups. Opposition to any efforts to alter or undermine the borders was 
then engrained into the Charter of the Organization of African Unity, declaring the 
existing boundaries inalterable (Org. of African Unity 17). 
On the whole, African states differ from those of many other regions as they do 
not represent the molding of identity through conflict, nor are they a reflection of the 
dynamics of exercisable economic, military, and administrative power and competency 
(Southall 153–156). Their boundaries were designed with neither ethnic identity nor the 
future viability of the area in mind. Given these factors, both causes and means, Africa is 
potentially endowed with not only a greater number of separatists, but separatists who 
have a stronger argument than separatists from many other areas of the world.  
Contemporary Conditions: The Secessionist Deficit as a Legitimizing Force 
Decolonization enabled the formal transfer of control to African leaders. 
However, they inherited states more in name than in capacity, as they had weak 
institutions, societal fissures from divisive colonial policies, and vulnerable economic 
structures centered on the exportation of raw resources and singular commodities (Herbst 
12
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97, 118, 135, 140). As one might expect given these circumstances, in the 56 years since 
decolonization began, Sub-Saharan Africa has witnessed consistently high levels of 
political violence and internal conflict (Englebert, Hummel 399).  
The states of Sub-Saharan Africa possess a host of social, economic, geographic, 
and state characteristics correlated with civil war and separatism (403–499). African 
states are regarded as being relatively young and still undergoing the throes of national 
integration and construction of a common identity (404). They consist of socially 
heterogeneous and polarized populations whose groups commonly engage in zero-sum 
interactions for control of the state (Englebert, Hummel 400). Significant reserves of 
natural resources exist that may act as incentives for the initiation of conflict for other 
internal and external actors, as well as being exported and sold by civil war combatants 
and separatists to fund existing conflict (400). African states are commonly ‘culturally 
alien’ to their populations, in contrast to states in other parts of the world, as a result of 
their borders, capital placement, and the colonial indoctrination of African elites (400). 
African states widely have weak records of evenly providing services and goods for their 
citizens, and control over these institutions is commonly the basis for conflict and neo-
patrimonial loyalty systems. The logical derivative of these factors is that a significant 
proportion of the political violence should be related to separatism.12 
Yet as Pierre Englebert and Rebecca Hummel illuminate in their work “Let’s 
Stick Together: Understanding Africa’s Secessionist Deficit”, secessionist conflict in 
Africa is well below predicted levels (401). Between 1960 and 2005, separatism only 
accounted for 27% of all domestic conflicts in Africa (400). Similarly, the levels of 
separatism in Africa are notably lower than many other regions of the world. In the same 
period of time, based on recorded instances of separatism, the average annual probability 
of a secessionist conflict occurring in Africa was only .06%, in comparison to .16 % in 
Asia, and .08% in the Middle East (and was matched by .06% probability of secession in 
Europe) (402). Though the deficit of secessionist activity offers fewer case studies to 
analyze, it deepens the gains of studying separatism in Africa, as those that do occur 
                                                
12 As mentioned previously, civil war and secession are differentiated by the intent of the groups, however I 
acknowledge the difficulty in determining a ‘critical date’ upon which to judge the true or dominant 
motives of a group. 
13
Kuntz: Redrawing Borders in Africa
Published by KnightScholar, 2013
 268 
should be more dire situations where internal actors have a more viable opportunity or are 
more committed to seceding.  
Examination of International Law: Viability of Secession 
 The international community does not recognize secession as a right. (Hannum 
13). Yet “international law does not prohibit secession, whether voluntary or violent, but 
it has neither recognized a right to secede nor identified even tentatively the conditions 
that might give rise to such a right in the future” (14). In the place of such a right, the 
viability of secession is reliant on a framework of distinct but interrelated aspects of 
international legal principles: state creation, Uti Posessidetis, self-determination, 
recognition, territory, and the privileged role of the state. 
The Framework of Statehood and Recognition 
 Acquisition of a sovereign state necessitates secessionist movements to fulfill the 
basic requirements of statehood as laid out in the 1993 Montevideo Convention on the 
Rights and Duties of States: a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, 
and the capacity to enter into relations with others states (Montevideo Convention). 
However, these requirements are broadly defined and subjectively interpreted, which 
makes fulfillment of these measurements of statehood relatively easy. This has in part 
been enabled by the development of the right to self-determination, which has modified 
the traditional circumstances and forms of these requirements (Shaw 183). No minimum 
population number has been established; moreover, defined and settled boundaries are 
not entirely necessary at the time of statehood. Instead, the area in question must be 
contiguous and undeniably controlled by the government aspiring to acquire statehood 
(183). The government has no necessary capacities or level of functionality beyond being 
able to engage in legal relations as it sees fit, being able to legislate and enforce the 
agreements it makes with states (181). This is the most crucial requirement of statehood, 
as it necessitates not only effective control but the legality of exercising control in so far 
as other states accept that legality and have a willingness to engage in relations by it.  
 The Montevideo Convention asserts that the existence of a state, and its 
possession of statehood, is independent of recognition by other states, and as such is able 
to defend its ‘integrity and independence’ regardless of its status as a recognized or 
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unrecognized state (Montevideo). The Convention further states that the rights of other 
states under international law form a limitation to the exercise of this right (Montevideo). 
Legal theory on state recognition is divided between Declaratory Theory and 
Constitutive Theory (Shaw 363). In accordance with the view of the Montevideo 
Convention, Declaratory Theory argues that recognition is an acceptance by ‘existing 
states’ of extant factual realities and circumstances (368). A new state, a category that 
includes secession under this theory, will be legally constituted by its own efforts and 
does not have to wait for recognition by other states, or the virtue of their consent to do 
so (368). Opposing Declaratory Theory and contrasting the Montevideo Convention, 
Constitutive Theory is set in the belief that states acquire “legal personality” and are 
established as full subjects of international law through the act of recognition by other 
states and by virtue of the will and consent of the international body of existing states 
(368–9). The practice of recognition has shown to take a middle road between these two 
theories. In concept, recognition indicates that the new state is capable of conforming to 
the basic requirements of international law and satisfies the qualifications for statehood. 
In practice, this rhetoric justifies highly politicized judgments of self-interest (372–3). 
The Framework of Territory and Sovereignty 
           The international system is premised on the stability and supremacy of territorially 
based states. The centrality of this concept is reflected in the framework of international 
laws and norms, particularly in the principle of territorial integrity, which prohibits any 
type of interference in the domestic affairs and territory recognized as being under the 
jurisdiction of a state (443). The state itself rests on the notions of positive and negative 
sovereignty (409). Positive sovereignty refers to the exclusive right of a state to exercise 
authority over its territory (412). Negative sovereignty refers to the right of a state to be 
free from external interference (412). At its core, the relationship between sovereignty 
and territory rests upon the concept of title, in other words, the factual and legal 
conditions that deem the ownership of territory, a relationship that while absolute in 
domestic territorial questions, is relative concerning international territory (412).  
Self-Determination as a Vector to Statehood 
 Separatists and advocates of secession as a policy cite the right to self-
determination to justify and enable their claims; particularly where the borders have been 
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formed by relatively artificial means (200). Self-determination evolved from a means of 
protecting minority populations, and is defined as the right of ‘all peoples…to freely 
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development’ (Basak 198). Self-determination was initially instated in international law 
through the Treaty of Versailles and the Fourteen Points speech, and then integrated into 
the encompassing framework of the U.N. Charter (198). However, the concept of self-
determination as a right was further legalized in the 1996 International Covenant of Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR).  
 However, self-determination is not a generalized right of secession; international 
law does not hold secession to be a right, nor does it regard self-determination as 
intended to or able to dissolve the sovereignty and territorial integrity of a state. The 
International Court of Justice has noted that all states have a right to territorial integrity 
and sovereignty regardless of the process of their formation (198). 
 In line with this, the reach of such arguments are limited as self-determination is 
engrained as being subservient to other principles of international law and its realization 
must conform to the Charter of the United Nations, as well as other sources of 
international law (228). Thus, though self-determination exists as part of an expanding 
regime on human rights, its scope and applicability to secession is limited (230, 269).13 
The Viability of Secession 
 As this examination has shown, the legal and logistical framework of the 
international system and its norms oppose secession, and deny its viability. Yet, 
international law remains an evolving subject, and the internal denial of the right to self-
determination may induce the development of an acceptable and legally recognized 
principle of external self-determination, or secession, through a series of exceptions. 
                                                
13Denial of the viability of secession through the right of self-determination was initially legalized in 1970 
with the passage by the U.N. of the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly 
Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. The 
Declaration of Friendly Relations defined self-determination employing similar language to the ICCPR and 
the ICESCR before stating that ‘Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or 
encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally, or in part, the territorial integrity or 
political unity of sovereign and independent states conducting themselves in compliance with the principle 
of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as described above and thus possessed of a government 
representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed, or colour.’ 
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For now though, without significant incentives for major powers to extend recognition, 
secession remains dependent on the agreement of the host state (whether voluntarily or 
through the inability to obtain military victory over a secessionist movements that obtains 
control over a significant percentage of territory) and the cost-benefit analysis of external 
states to act or influence the negotiations. 
Case Study Analysis: Tracing Secession and Identifying Differentiating Variables 
 The aim of this analysis is to draw out the factors that seem to be the significant 
determinants of whether or not a secession will achieve statehood. Case study analysis is 
employed to identify these determinants and, through examination of their contextual 
roles, to understand how they impact the fate of a separatist movement. The case studies 
are ordered by their similarity, progressing from the successful cases, to the failures, to 
the exception. Each case study is broken into five sections. First, a brief overview of the 
secession is given. Second, the origin of the conflict is identified and explored. Third, the 
domestic, regional and international course of the secession is reviewed. Fourth, the 
arguments and demands of the secessionist movement are examined in conjunction with 
the basis of the conflict to determine their legality. The last section examines the costs of 
the conflict, the presence of resources, and the involvement of external actors. 
 These case studies enable the compilation and discussion of potentially significant 
determinants. These determinants are identified and judged before being used to construct 
an investigative framework that is applied to all of the cases to see if any trends or 
patterns are identifiable as to what differentiates failure from success. 
Selection of Case Studies 
  Eritrea and South Sudan were selected for case analysis because in both cases, 
separatists achieved statehood. Katanga and Biafra were both significant separatist 
conflicts, in terms of the costs and the actors involved, yet failed to acquire statehood. 
Lacking statehood despite possessing the most acceptable legal justification, Somaliland 
offers a unique opportunity for analysis. 
Eritrea: Overview 
 Eritrea emerged as the first and, as of then, only exception to the inviolability of 
post-colonial African state borders. Eritrea was neither ethnically nor religiously 
homogenous, but was bound by the experience of Italian colonialism and persecution by 
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the Ethiopian State (Pavkovic, Radan 497). After 30 years of conflict, Eritrea attained 
recognition as an independent sovereign state in 1993 after a U.N. monitored referendum 
on independence, in which 98.5% of Eritreans supported independence (497). Ethiopia, 
the host state, agreed to the referendum in 1991, as it lacked either the will or capacity to 
oppose the measure, or the resources potentially necessary to maintain unity (Paquin 
128). Ethiopian consent to the process and subsequent recognition of Eritrea enabled 
O.A.U. support, and uncontested international recognition of Eritrea (Pavkovic, Radan 
497). 
Origin of Secession 
Though Ethiopia rebuffed Italian colonial efforts it ceded the territory of Eritrea to 
Italy in 1889 (497). From then until the Second World War, Eritrea existed as an Italian 
colony, briefly being united with Ethiopia in 1935 under Fascist Italy until its defeat by 
local and British forces, which allowed Ethiopia to reclaim its independence (497). In 
contrast, Eritrea became a British trusteeship for the remainder of the war until a decision 
could be made as to its future (497). In 1953, the U.N. made the contentious choice of 
placing Eritrea in a federation with Ethiopia through the Contractual Federal Act. This act 
structured the federation such that Eritrea was separate and autonomous, with its own 
constitution and elected government (498). Despite the designs of the U.N. Ethiopia soon 
began to violate and undermine Eritrean autonomy (Paquin 130). The culmination of this 
pattern of actions occurred in 1962, when Ethiopia revoked the federal status and 
nullified its autonomy through annexation, transforming it into the 14th province of 
Ethiopia (130). The violation of Eritrean autonomy extended into the linguistic realm, 
when contrary to the constitution of Eritrea, Amharic replaced Tigrinya and Arabic as the 
official languages (Pavkovic, Radan 46). Though Eritreans appealed to the U.N., it 
avoided any responsibility by claiming the matter to be domestic in nature (498). 
Review of Secession 
These actions served as the catalyst of the secessionist conflict, causing the 
emergence of Eritrean secessionist insurgencies and the launch of guerilla warfare 
campaigns (Paquin 130). In 1974, the Emperor of Ethiopia, Haile Selassie, was 
overthrown by a military coup, which formed a military regime, also known as the Derg, 
led by Menguistu Haile Mariam. The regime proceeded to use brutal military force to 
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silence and severely suppress all forms of dissent and ethnic claims (Spears 46). This 
effort backfired as it galvanized secessionist movements, induced the emergence of 
internal non-exclusive insurgencies of marginalized groups that sought to overthrow the 
state, and “drove Ethiopians in increasing numbers toward the rebel fronts” (Spears 46, 
71; Paquin 131). 
 Ethiopia sought to address these insurgencies through the use of military force, 
posturing for U.S.S.R. aid as their relationship with the U.S. and the wider regional 
context made it unwilling to supply arms (Paquin 130). Previously the U.S. had 
maintained support for Ethiopia due to the importance of a communications station in 
Eritrea, and its desire for stability in that area (Spears 55). However, technological 
advances and relocation of the station removed those incentives. As the U.S. withdrew, 
the U.S.S.R. moved in, committing $1,000,000 worth of armaments, hundreds of military 
advisors and 11,000 Cuban troops (55). Prior to this, Eritrean separatists had pushed 
Ethiopian forces out of Eritrean territory, denying Ethiopian sea access, which 
necessitated a restructuring of the army in the view of the regime (57). The shift was 
primarily from quality, with 40,000 British trained soldiers, to quantity, with several 
hundred thousand poorly trained and poorly disciplined but heavily armed soldiers (55). 
 In 1982 Ethiopia launched Operation Red Star, a massive effort utilizing its 
restructured army and the support of the U.S.S.R., and erased almost of the gains Eritrean 
separatists had made, regaining significant control over Eritrean territory (61). Yet it 
failed to capture key Eritrean cities, and provided Eritrean separatists with massive 
amounts of modern weaponry and equipment whenever the haphazard Ethiopian soldiers 
withdrew or surrendered (Spears 61). Soviet support pushed back the gains of the 
separatists, however the failure to establish effective control of major cities made these 
gains hollow. The dominant separatist group, the Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front, was 
able to construct “structures and institutions that made Eritrea a virtual state within a 
state” (61). By setting up government administration, farms, hospitals, and weapon 
factories, separatists were able to satisfy their logistical needs at the same time as 
fulfilling the qualifiers for statehood (61). 
 Expanding rebel capacity met with the fall of the Soviet Union and the 
withdrawal and discontinuation of support for Ethiopia caused the fall of the government 
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(Paquin 130). The transitional government ratified a new constitution allowing for 
secession and worked with the EPLF to set the date for a referendum on independence. 
The EPLF postponed the referendum until the new government could stabilize (81). Then 
in the wake of the U.N. monitored referendum on independence, Eritrea declared its 
independence on May 24th 1994, being recognized by Ethiopia, the O.A.U., and the 
international community, and obtaining U.N. state membership, as well as acceptance 
into the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (84). 
Legality of Claim 
Eritrea had an excellent legal basis for its claim to independence. Eritrean 
separatists argued that theirs was a case of independence, not secession. The basis of their 
claim centered on having been historically denied their right to self-determination, first 
by Italian colonialism, and then through the U.N. imposed federation with Ethiopia, 
which illegally absorbed it soon after (Pavkovic, Radan 498). The claim was set in clearly 
defined borders demarcating contiguous territory, over which the separatists exercised 
effective control (Herbst 107). Moreover, the claim asserted the right of the Eritrean 
peoples, which were neither ethnically nor religiously homogenous. Ethiopia offered a 
weak counter to their assertion, claiming that pre-colonial unity had existed under a 
single empire, however even this only occurred from 1880 to 1885 (Pavkovic, Radan 43). 
Costs, Resources, and External Actors 
 An array of external factors impacted the conflict or emerged as a result of it. In 
terms of external stability, the conflict had a major spillover effect, with an estimated 
500,000–600,000 refugees fleeing to Sudan, Kenya and Djibouti (135). An additional 
80,000–100,000 exiles and émigrés fled to Arab States (135). At roughly 100,000 strong 
in the U.S., the Ethiopian and Eritrean Diasporas supported their respective movements, 
but shared the goal of overthrowing the Ethiopian state (Paquin 148). Neighboring and 
regional states backed the Eritrean independence movements, particularly Libya, Egypt, 
Sudan and Somalia. Syria, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabica, China, South Yemen and Cuba 
also provided varying degrees of support (Rothschild, Olunsorola 217). The U.S. and the 
Russia came to be involved supporting the push for independence as means for Russia to 
demobilize an unaffordable military presence and for the U.S. to bring about stability. 
Eritrea lacks resources in the general view, having no significant discovered reserves of 
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oil or minerals; however it does possess access to the sea, a potentially critical good for 
neighboring landlocked countries. 
South Sudan: Overview 
 Through the right of a referendum on independence held in January 2011, as 
designated in the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement that ended the Second Sudanese 
Civil War, South Sudan became an independent and sovereign state in July of 2011. 
Waged across nearly 60 years and two major civil wars, the conflict was one of the 
deadliest and most destabilizing wars in Africa (Pavkovic, Radan 506). The origin of the 
conflict lay with colonial consolidation, and subsequent neglect and maladministration by 
the government, due in part to the centralizing of power in the North as well as the later 
discovery of significant oil holdings in the South (505). 
Origin of Secession 
 After Britain and Egypt conquered Sudan in 1898, Britain administered Northern 
Sudan and Southern Sudan separately for the next 40 years or so (Hannum 309). This 
differentiation was necessary as the populations differ significantly; the North is of Arab 
descent, Islamic, and speaks Arabic while the South is of Black descent, is Christian and 
Animist, and speaks indigenous languages and English (308–9). Prior to decolonization 
in the 1950s, South Sudan was merged with Sudan, however Egypt and the United 
Kingdom gave executive powers and the role of civil administration to the North. 
(Pavkovic, Radan 505). 
 South Sudan never had a chance of contesting the shape of Sudanese 
decolonization, as the consolidated borders were solidified in a conference in 1947 
(Hannum 307). Though held in Juba, the capital of the South, the only Southern 
representatives were on the payroll of the British, who sided with the interests of the 
North and of Egypt, which were for unity (307). Following this conference, Southerners 
remained politically marginalized through decolonization and the formal independence of 
Sudan in 1956 (307). This structure converged with religious and cultural differences and 
a weak post-colonial state to create conditions for civil war (Pavkovic, Radan 505). 
Review of Secession 
The conflict began in 1955, the year prior to Sudanese independence, and was 
drive by political frustration and marginalization of the South (506). As the war 
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progressed, Southern rebels succeeded in forcing the withdrawal of government forces 
(506). These gains contributed to the launch of a military coup in 1958. The military 
government combated dissent with force, and sought to weaken Southern political power 
and impose Islam and Arabic on the South (Hannum 309). In 1964 these measures 
induced massive general strikes in the North in protest of the government, leading to its 
fall (309). 
 The following year, a transitional government was formed, which held a round 
table conference in March in an effort to bring an end to the conflict (310). Though being 
attended by the representatives of major factions in the North and South, the conference 
reached no conclusion, and was undermined by anti-Southern violence (309). Amidst 
these overtures of peace, Southern groups set up a provisional government with local 
councils, courts, schools and clinics in the areas under Southern control (311). In what 
has become a theme of Sudanese administrations, the government was once again 
overtaken by a military coup, with Numeiri taking power (311). The First Sudanese Civil 
War then ended in 1972, as the government and major rebel groups signed the Addis 
Ababa Accords (Pavkovic, Radan 505), which established regional self-government for 
the South, granting it control over economic and security matters (Hannum 312). Peace 
was also secured through alteration of the constitution to recognize English as a primary 
language and the right of the South to religious freedom (312). 
 The measures of the 1972 agreement were sufficient in bringing about peace, with 
minor residual instances of conflict. However plans to construct a canal and divert 
Southern water, potentially causing the loss of arable land for 2.6 million people, created 
growing tension. The discovery of oil reserves in Southern and border territory in 1979 
by Chevron exacerbated the situation, as the state built refineries in the North and sought 
to redistrict the oil sectors out of Southern control (Hannum 313). Reacting to these 
tensions in 1981, the state removed the regional president of the South, dissolved its 
assembly, performed wide scale arrests of dissenters and appointed a military government 
(313). These antagonistic tactics extended into 1983, when the government imposed the 
‘September Laws’, institutionalizing an ‘Islamization’ of the state, as well as re-dividing 
the area of Southern provinces (313). 
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 In response to these policies and actions, the Sudan People’s Liberation 
Movement and its armed wing, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army were formed with 
the intent of reforming Sudan, and the Second Sudanese Civil War began when Southern 
soldiers mutinied against orders to transfer to the North. As the civil war continued, the 
government was wracked by two military coups, one in 1985, which led to failed peace 
talks, and another in 1989 in the wake of a ceasefire agreement and a debilitating famine 
(314). The 1990s witnessed the spread of the conflict to other areas of Sudan as other 
groups took up arms against the government, and the efforts of regional powers, 
specifically the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, to bring about peace 
through talks (Pavkovic, Radan 506). 
  By 1998, the military position of the North and its ability to sustain the conflict 
was rapidly eroding (Natsios 162). The situation of the state worsened considerably in 
2001 as infighting between Southern rebels ended and they aligned in opposition to the 
state (Pavkovic, Radan 596). These circumstances brought about the signing of the 
Machakos Protocol by the SPLM and the state government (506). Through the Protocol, 
parties involved agreed that South Sudan had a right to self-determination within the 
structure of the Sudanese state. Additionally, the division of state and religion, and the 
practical implications of this division were agreed upon (505). 
The Machakos Protocol was the first of a series of agreements that formed the 
2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which ended the Second Sudanese Civil War and 
established the date for a referendum among Southern Sudanese on whether to secede or 
not (506). Internal and external factors led to the participation, agreement and general 
adherence to the C.P.A. in contrast to past agreements. Internally, the civil war had had a 
debilitating economic cost, consuming more than half of the oil revenues of the state 
(Natsios 163). Politically, the state believed that the potential secession could be 
mitigated and that unity could be made attractive to the Southerners (163). Given that 
throughout the majority of the conflict rebels sought to reform the state, nor secede, this 
was not implausible. However, Khartoum did not consider how past experiences could 
undermine unity arguments, or how to communicate such a message. Externally, United 
States intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan made maintenance and improvement of 
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relations with Washington a high priority for Khartoum, which required an end to the 
civil war (Natsios 171). 
The C.P.A. formally established the autonomous Government of South Sudan in 
Juba and set up the interim Government of National Unity in Khartoum. The key aspects 
were that it allowed the military wing of the SPLM to continue to exist and receive 
external assistance to train and modernize, it outlined the sharing of oil revenue between 
Khartoum and Juba, and most notably it set January 2011 as the deadline for the 
referendum on Southern independence (171). The C.P.A. differed from past agreements 
due the level of involvement by external actors, specifically the United States. Though 
Khartoum commonly discarded agreements in the past, the U.S. offered the government 
incentives to allow for peace and the referendum to take place (169). Beyond this 
external pressure, the provisions of the agreement that allowed the Southern military to 
train, expand and modernize made cost for disruption high and the plausibility of 
significant bargaining chips or territorial gains low (171). These factors and significant 
international attention enabled the referendum to be successful held in January of 2011, 
and with 99% of Southerners voting for independence, and South Sudan to achieve 
sovereign statehood in July later that year (BBC). 
Legality of Claim 
South Sudan had a clear and powerful claim to independence, although the aim of 
Southern actors for the majority of the conflict was reform, not secession. In the 
framework of Uti Possidetis, South Sudan had been administered separately from Sudan 
under colonialism. Beyond this, South Sudan had been granted the right to secede 
through the 2005 C.P.A., to which Sudan had agreed. By repeatedly violating past 
agreements that had measures short of independence, Khartoum demonstrated the 
intractability of the conflict without a more permanent solution.  
Costs, Resources, and External Actors 
External actors and factor were significantly involved in determining the course 
of the two civil wars and South Sudan’s eventual acquisition of independence. Similar to 
the conflict in Eritrea, the conflict in Sudan generated hundreds of thousands of refugees 
abroad and internally (UNHCR). Beyond the already discussed role of the United States, 
Ethiopia, Israel, Kenya and Uganda all provided direct and or indirect assistance to the 
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Southerners (Hannum 326). The South also had support from non-state actors, primarily 
non-governmental organizations directly tied to the institutions or constituents of 
Christian churches (Natsios 172).14 Though supporting the Southerners represented one 
way for other states to indirectly oppose Khartoum, another major potential incentive is 
the significant oil reserves found in the Southern region, roughly estimated at 5.4 billion 
barrels of oil (Trivett). An expanding Diaspora of Southern Sudanese existed throughout 
the conflict, supporting the effort through lobbying efforts, economic support and 
ultimately participation in the global referendum. 
Katanga: Overview 
On July 11th 1960, Katanga, a province in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
declared independence and called upon states to recognize it (Rothschild, Olunsorola 
201).15 Though ethnic and political differences existed between Katanga and the D.R.C., 
the conflict was primarily centered on control over the significant mineral resources and 
potential wealth of the province (Pavkovic, Radan 122). The attempt at secession was 
relatively brief, being brought to an end by the intervention of U.N. forces at the request 
of the D.R.C. without recognition by any other state (122). 
Origin of Secession 
The origin of the conflict rests with the presence of the mining corporation ‘Union 
Miniere du Haut-Katanga’ (Rothschild, Olunsorola 201). Offering mining opportunities 
and services paralleling those of the central government, the area had a white settler 
population exceeding 30,000 in 1960 (201). The concept of ‘Katanga’ as being distinct 
from the rest of the D.R.C. emerged in the 1950s, when immigration into the area 
induced fear of displacement and discrimination by the inhabitants. This caused the 
different demographics of the region to align (201). The interests of the corporation and 
Belgium soon came to match those of the white settlers as the dependent condition of the 
country and future profits of corporations was challenged by local political elites (202). 
Moise Tshombe integrated these sentiments into his political party, ‘Confederation des 
Associations Tribales du Katanga’ (CONAKAT) (202). The party dominated regional 
                                                
14These included a wide array of Christian non-state actors, ranging from the evangelical ‘Samaritan Purse,’ 
conservative Christians, the Catholic Church, black American churches and moderate protestant churches.  
15I encountered conflicting dates as to the secession of Katanga, with some listing the 17th of July rather 
than the 11th. 
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elections, but did poorly in national elections, securing only two minor posts in the 
central government (202). This led the party to perceive itself as having been politically 
excluded, and caused it to consider secession as an option (202). CONAKAT initially 
planned to secede two days prior to the declaration of independence by the Democratic 
Republic of Congo; however Belgian officials persuaded them to delay their efforts 
(202). Plans resumed however, when Congolese soldiers mutinied against European 
officers and targeted white settlers with violence, destabilizing the central government in 
the process as it struggled to subdue the violence (202). 
Review of Secession 
Taking advantage of the opening provided by the mutiny and the presence of 
6,000 Belgian soldiers within its borders, Katanga declared itself as a sovereign and 
independent state on July 11th and ‘asked all to recognize in us the right of every people 
to self-determination’ (202). Katanga immediately asked Belgium for technical, financial 
and military aid, specifically in the interest of training a Kantangan military force (202). 
The immediate prospects of Katanga were mixed, as the secession effort had the 
resources of the settlers as well as those of the mining corporation. Belgium did not 
recognize Katanga but did provide assistance and had its troops in the territory disarm 
soldiers loyal to the central government (202). Its initial internal prospects severely 
contrasted with its international presence. African states opposed the secession, viewing 
it as a plot to undermine the independence of the D.R.C. and enable Europeans to further 
exploit the resources of the area (202). States throughout Asia expressed similar 
sentiments (203). Beyond Belgium, other European states did not offer recognition, as 
opposition by African and Asian states as well as the timing of the secession, being in the 
midst of decolonization, caused the costs of such an action to far outweigh the benefits 
(203). 
The U.N. also came to oppose the secession, fearing that if successful, Katanga 
might set a precedent of both rich regions seceding from poor states, and enabling 
challenging of the territorial integrity of post-colonial states (Pavkovic, Radan 122). In 
reaction, the U.N. Security Council affirmed the territorial integrity of the D.R.C., 
asserting that the territory was being decolonized as a unified whole (123). 
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Patrice Lumumba, Prime Minister of the D.R.C. requested U.N. intervention in 
order to end the separatist bid and resolve the situation (Rothschild, Olunsorola 203). The 
Security Council agreed, however it primarily sought to deescalate the situation, not 
remove the secession (123). Having called upon Belgium to withdraw its troops 
previously, the Security Council passed Resolution 146, which authorized the 
deployment of a U.N. force, with the objectives of maintaining order, protecting human 
lives, and forcing the withdrawal of Belgian troops and foreign mercenaries from the 
Area (203). The U.N. Force was then deployed throughout non-separatist territory. U.N. 
troops refrained from engaging Katangan forces out of concern for casualties in what 
some members of the international community believed was a domestic issue outside the 
jurisdiction of the U.N (203). 
In response to this, Lumumba ordered the D.R.C. Army to retake Katanga (203). 
The deployment of the Army failed to resolve the situation, as the campaign quickly 
degenerated into indiscriminate violence and drew into a stalemate when the President 
removed Lumumba, and threw the government into chaos. Initially this offered Katanga a 
chance to consolidate, however it soon faced a separatist movement within its own 
borders that escalated into a second conflict, bearing brutal violations of human rights 
(201). 
These circumstances drove an alignment of positions among regional and 
international actors in favor of ending the conflict (204). However, concern regarding the 
potential precedent of such an intervention stymied consensus as to what measures could 
be taken, with Asian and African states supporting the use of direct force and European 
states largely favoring the use of negotiation (204). Though no clear harmony was 
achieved, the Security Council passed Resolution 169, which aimed to maintain the 
integrity of the D.R.C. and bring an end to the conflict. The Resolution circumvented 
concerns of setting a precedent by authorizing troops on the ground to essentially act as 
they saw fit to achieve their objectives, and disarm and remove all foreign forces by any 
means necessary (204). U.N. troops proceeded to crush the secession, and obtained 
legitimacy afterwards when the Government of Katanga ended the bid for secession on 
January 13th 1963, while in exile in Northern Rhodesia (204). 
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Legality of Claim 
 Katanga had no legal basis for its secession. It had not been administered 
separately from the rest of the D.R.C., nor had it been politically marginalized or 
antagonized by the central government. Its population did not identify as distinct from the 
D.R.C. except for a few years leading up to the secession, a point which was itself 
undermined by a secession from Katanga in the north. The weak legal basis of its claim is 
reflected in the near uniform opposition it met with from the international community. 
Lastly, it declared its independence after the D.R.C. had done so and been recognized by 
other states. As a result, the Katangan declaration of independence violated the territorial 
integrity and sovereignty of the D.R.C. 
Costs, Resources, and External Actors 
Local, regional, and international actors opposed the secession of Katanga, 
denying it recognition or support, except for Belgium in the latter case. Significant 
mineral resources, in the form of diamonds and precious metals, played a significant role 
in the push for secession; however their presence failed to either sustain the separatists or 
induce support for the secession. The conflict did not undermine the external stability of 
the area, as the costs of the conflict, economically and on a human level remained within 
the country. Finally, though the subject of sympathy from Europeans, Katanga lacked any 
type of support beyond that provided by Belgium. 
Biafra: Overview 
 On May 30th, 1967, the Republic of Biafra declared its independence from 
Nigeria. Issues of identity primarily drove the push for independence, although the 
possession of significant oil reserves in the territory declaring independence played a role 
in both the preliminary analysis of separatists and the conflict itself. In contrast to 
Katanga, Biafra achieved recognition, though it was only to be a handful of states. 
Beyond recognition, Biafra received limited support from regional and international 
actors, yet the majority of rhetorical, logistical and material support was for the central 
government. After 3 years of conflict and famine, Biafran forces surrendered to the 
Nigerian High Command on January 14th, 1970 (Pavkovic, Radan 96). Waged primarily 
through traditional warfare and amidst starvation and disease, the cost of the conflict 
rounded out at an estimated 1,000,000 deaths (96). 
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Origin of Secession 
The origin of the secession rests with the self-reinforcing inter-ethnic conflict 
between elites for control of the state that then devolved to the ground level where groups 
of individuals began targeting each other along ethnic lines. Nigeria transitioned into 
independence as a federal state, with three federal units, each corresponding with an 
ethnic identity majority, with one outlier (98). Over half of the population of Nigeria 
could fall into one of these three categories, the interplay of which dominated politics and 
civil services, making utilization of ethnicity necessary. The Hausa, numbering around 15 
million, were predominantly found in the North of the country. The Yoruba, numbering 
10 million, lived in the West and Midwest of the country (98). Lastly, and of significance 
for this study, the Ibo, numbering ten million, resided in the East and Midwest. This 
placement does not encompass the entirety of individuals who may be perceived or self-
identify as belonging to these groups, instead existing spread across the country. 
 On January 15th 1966, a group of Ibo army majors staged a coup, killing political 
and military leaders of other ethnicities in the process (98). The coup was thwarted 
however by Major General Ironsi, an Ibo, who imprisoned the soldiers (98). Ironsi 
followed this by abolishing the existing divisions between regions of the federation, and 
integrating regional and federal services (98). In May of the same year, large-scale riots 
occurred in the North, leading to the massacre of several hundred Ibo (99). Then on the 
28th of July, Northern military members launched what they deemed as a countercoup 
against Ironsi, deposing him and purging eastern officers (99). Facing a splintering 
central government, regional leaders convened to stabilize the situation, however they 
failed to reach agreement on a means of resolving the situation. This failure, and the 
widening violence against easterners as a result of the countercoup, led the eastern 
government to look towards secession (99). 
 In the wake of the failed conference, the Northern Army killed between 7,000 and 
10,000 Ibos in the North. This prompted a mass exodus of Ibos and other Easterners to 
the East, estimated to be around 1.5 million. The situation was exacerbated in October 
when several hundred more Ibo were killed and hundreds of thousands were expelled 
(Pavkovic, Radan 99). Though the majority of Eastern military and government officials 
were already convinced of the merits of secession, the declaration of a state of emergency 
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by the central government and a redrawing of province borders persuaded those who had 
remained opposed to the idea (100). 
Review of Secession 
 On May 30th, 1967, the Republic of Biafra declared its independence from 
Nigeria, launching a propaganda campaign centered on ethnic differences between Biafra 
and Nigeria, beyond calling upon foreign states to provide recognition and support (101). 
Advocates for Biafra and the Biafran government’s Swiss public relations firm waged 
their campaign by framing the situation through rhetoric, photographs, and footage that 
echoed the Holocaust and made an obvious association (Baum). The propaganda 
eventually gained the attention of the foreign media, who quickly made it a major focus 
for people throughout the world, bringing in unprecedented humanitarian assistance 
(101). Despite remaining chaos among the central government, state forces occupied the 
Midwest. This offensive quickly stalled and was overrun by the Biafran Army. In what 
some historians view as the fatal error of the Biafran secession, the Biafran Army failed 
to make use of this victory, opting to wait for reinforcements rather than push for the 
capital region and potential force the central government to consent to the secession. As 
the central government stabilized itself, it recaptured the Midwest, and came to encircle 
Biafra and occupy all of its coastal areas by 1968 (101). A stalemate arose due to external 
aid mitigating the impact of the siege, however improved armament of the state forces 
and food and medicine shortages eventually led to the collapse of Biafran forces, and 
occupation of the territory by state forces. Then on January 9th , 1970, Biafran forces 
surrendered, bringing an end to the conflict (101).  
Legality of Claim 
 From a strict legal perspective, Biafra had no legal basis to secede. It was not 
administered separately under colonialism, nor did domestic Nigerian law enable such an 
act. Biafra was ethnically and religiously distinct from the rest of the country, being 
primarily Ibo and Christian. However, pockets of different groups existed throughout the 
country, and were often integrated into local communities. The violence that precipitated 
the secession was significant, as too was that which occurred over the course of the 
conflict. The value of these factors as evidence of the necessity for a separate state was 
30
Proceedings of GREAT Day, Vol. 2012 [2013], Art. 16
https://knightscholar.geneseo.edu/proceedings-of-great-day/vol2012/iss1/16
 285 
undermined by lack of state directed violence, and the unity of other provinces and ethnic 
groups with the state.  
Costs, Resources, and External Actors 
 On an external level, the O.A.U. opposed the secession, repeatedly trying to bring 
about peace and calling upon ‘the secessionist leaders to cooperate with the Federal 
authorities for the purpose of restoring peace and unity to Nigeria’ (Baum). Though 
formally opposed, the issue split the O.A.U (Pavkovic, Radan 101). Tanzania, Gabon, 
Ivory Coast, and Zambia extended recognition of Biafra, acknowledging the need for 
unity and territorial integrity, but arguing that these goals could not be achieved without 
consideration for the conditions necessary. Beyond the O.A.U., Haiti and South Africa 
also recognized Biafra (101).  
 The state received the majority of material support, being armed and supplied by 
the U.K., the U.S.S.R. and the U.S., varying from light arms to planes and heavy artillery. 
Biafra received support indirectly from Gabon, Israel, South Africa, China and France, 
mainly in the form of light arms (101). On the non-state front, Biafra received support 
from the International Red Cross, and joint church aid in the form of food and medicine 
(101). Although the conflict was highly intense, it was relatively short and external 
instability was limited (Baum). 
Somaliland: Overview 
 On the 18th of May 1991, the Republic of Somaliland declared its independence, 
repealing the Union Act of 1960, and returning to its original status and borders prior to 
its federation with Somalia (Paquin 156). After resolving an initial period of internal 
conflict that lasted until 1997, Somaliland has progressively met and exceeded the 
qualifications of statehood: possessing an operational government, stable and effective 
institutions, a functional economy and having held both a referendum on the constitution 
and multi-party democratic elections (152). However, despite these indicators and a 
strong legal claim to statehood, it only possesses de facto recognition from other states 
(Pavkovic, Radan 503). 
Origin of Secession 
 From 1897 until decolonization, British Somaliland existed as a British colony, 
distinct from Somalia (Paquin 152). On the 26th of June 1960, Somaliland declared its 
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independence and was recognized by the U.S. and 35 other states (152). Shortly after 
obtaining independent statehood, Somaliland passed the Union Act of 1960 and joined 
with Italian Somalia to form a federal republic, which was relatively homogenous 
ethnically, linguistically and religiously (153). The nature of this union shifted though 
when the president of Somalia unified the two states by means of a unilateral decree, 
without basis in a treaty or the consent of Somaliland. This amalgamation was then 
reinforced through a tyranny of the majority, when a constitution affirming the existence 
of a single state was put to referendum and supported by Italian Somalis (153). 
Review of Secession 
 Events in Mogadishu altered the political landscape considerably in 1969, when 
Siad Barre launched a military coup against the state, seizing power, suspending the 
constitution, dissolving the legislature, and nationalizing private industry (153). Barre 
initially founded a military regime with the backing of the U.S.S.R.; however, his goal of 
uniting Somalis within one greater Somali state and consequent invasion of Ethiopia 
caused the U.S.S.R. to withdraw support, a gap that the U.S. cautiously filled (154). 
 In the 1980s, lingering dissent and further political marginalization brought about 
the formation of the Somali National Movement (SNM), which initially sought to 
overthrow Barre and restore the initial federal state arrangement (154). In 1988, operating 
out of Ethiopia with the support of the Addis Ababa, the SNM pushed Barre’s forces out 
of important cities, Hargeisa and Burao. The state military regime responded through a 
campaign of aerial bombardment, focusing heavily on urban areas (Paquin 154). By the 
close of the 1980s, deaths estimated to have resulted from the conflict exceeded 50,000 
(154). 
 Somaliland was not alone in its conflict against the regime as other groups, 
notably the United Somali Congress and the Somali Patriotic Front, also waged war to 
overthrow Barre (155). The weight of these conflicts resulted in a shift in the nature of 
the secessionist conflict over the course of the 1990s, as the central government lost 
administrative functionality and military capacity in 1990 and then dissolved shortly after 
in 1991 (155). Despite having brought about the fall of the Barre regime, the SNM was 
alienated from efforts to reform a federal state by infighting among other anti-Barre 
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factions and a sense of exclusion due to the unilateral formation of a new government by 
the United Somali Congress (Pavkovic, Radan 501). 
 Following internal reconciliation, the Republic of Somaliland declared its 
independence on the 18th of May 1991, repealing the Union Act of 1960 that originally 
incorporated it into a federation with Somalia (501). Citing its previous status as a 
separate, independent and sovereign state and delineating its borders as those it originally 
held, Somaliland asserted itself as a case of dissolution, not secession (Paquin 155). 
However, as no government existing in Mogadishu was considered competent, no 
consent could be acquired for the dissolution, a condition that led the O.A.U. to oppose 
recognition (156–7). 
 Conflict embroiled Somaliland once more however, as loyalists to the state 
launched attacks, and internal dissent arose due to issues of political representation and 
efforts to demobilize soldiers (Paquin 160). By 1997, internal stability and relative peace 
was reacquired, and external stability was finally established, hemming the generation of 
refugees, a major issue in the past with over 300,000 Somalilanders being displaced to 
Ethiopia alone in the 1980s (Pavkovic, Radan 501–2). From this point onward, 
Somaliland has increasingly not only fulfilled the basic requirements of statehood but 
also demonstrated its functional capacity as a state and government. Beyond improving 
its economy, multi-party democracy was instated, with a referendum on the constitution 
that identified Somaliland as separate and independent of Somalia passing (Paquin 161). 
 Somalia remains unstable and without a competent and capable central 
government, and in the two decades since its declaration of independence Somaliland 
remains without de jure recognition by any state (Pavkovic, Radan 502). However, de 
facto recognition has been achieved with Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, the U.S. and some 
other states (Paquin 161). 
Legality of Claim 
 Somaliland holds a relatively strong legal basis for its claim to independence. It 
argues that its independence is not secessionist in nature but rather an act of dissolution. 
Though the African Union has remained opposed to this as Somalia has not consented to 
this dissolution, the forced unification of the two separately recognized states and 
violation of the legal basis of the federation in doing so supports the argument of 
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Somaliland. That a significant amount of the international community and major powers, 
such as the United States, initially recognized Somaliland when it first obtained 
independence undermines to a degree the notion that the re-extension of recognition 
would set a precedent for secession. On the issue of territory, the proposed territory of 
Somaliland is that which it originally was recognized as possessing and this claim does 
not infringe on the recognized territory of any other state except Somalia. 
 
Costs, Resources, and External Actors  
 Though Somaliland is relatively isolated from the violence found throughout 
much of Somalia, the conflict stage left at least 50,000 dead with an estimated 180,000 
civilians displaced within Somaliland and 300,000 displaced within neighboring states 
(Pavkovic, Radan 502). However, the shift in the nature of the conflict, marked by the 
loss of capacity by the central government to oppose the independence has led to 
mitigated continued internal and external costs and impact on stability.  
 Significant resource reserves have not been found to exist in Somaliland as of 
this time, though exploration rights from the 1980s to parts of its territory remain in the 
hands of oil companies (Paquin 168). Similar to Eritrea though, Somaliland does have 
significant coastal access, an important physical feature in the consideration of regional 
actors and political dynamic (Pavkovic, Radan 503). In part due to this coastal access, 
Ethiopia has consistently provided support for Somaliland. Egypt, with the backing of 
Saudi Arabia and other Arab states, has opposed the secession, to stymy Ethiopia (503). 
Kenya has supported the Somali state due to its investment in the Transitional 
Government of Somalia (503). Beyond the regional level, South Africa has provided 
support to Somaliland, and the UK has been involved in pushing for support of 
recognition (503). On the note of support, Somaliland does possess a Diaspora, however 
it is relatively small, unorganized and split between different countries (Paquin 160). 
Differentiating the Exceptions 
 Examination of the cases of Eritrea, South Sudan, Biafra, Katanga and Somaliland 
enable the identification of local, regional and international factors that may explain their 
differing outcomes and offer insight beyond the specifics of each case. Factors drawn 
from the case studies are distilled to their basic form in the interest of being transferable 
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or able to find commonality among variations of details. Factors will be identified at the 
local, regional and international levels. Each will be discussed in terms of its potential 
merit for determining the outcome of a secession, and examples from the case studies 




Local Level Factors 
  Separatist movements do not possess the guarantee of survival that states hold 
(Jackson 3). Separatist movements must not only avoid destruction by the original state 
and non-state factions, but must also maintain a sufficient level of functionality to 
continue their bid for statehood.  
 The first local factor is whether or not the host state is capable of opposing the 
secession. Where it cannot, the state may be more broadly dysfunctional, and be 
considered legally incompetent, and incapable of consenting to a secession. In all of the 
case studies, the host state of the separatist movement is at least initially capable of 
opposing the secession, or the groups that shift to separatist agendas (it would need to be 
capable enough to antagonize such groups sufficiently to drive them to secede in the first 
place). Pierre Englebert’s thesis on the deficit of separatism in Sub-Saharan Africa 
supports this, as he asserts that elites and marginalized groups will generally seek to take 
control of the state rather than seek to secede, given the difficulty of secession and the 
relatively valuable nature of control in Africa over extant state institutions (Englebert, 
Hummel 405). 
 The second significant local level factor is whether or not the state is able to 
exercise effective control over the separatist territory. If the host state is able to reassert 
effective control over the territory in question, this tends to indicate the destruction or 
crippling of the separatist movement. If not signifying destruction on the battlefield, this 
may show a denial of resources, and affect the analysis of other actors. As Katanga and 
Biafra display, when forces representing or acting on behalf of the state took possession 
of the territory, the claim was withdrawn and the bid ended. However, the Eritrean case 
shows that if the host state captures the territory through especially destructive tactics, but 
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fails to gain complete control, the backlash may be greater than the initial opposition. 
Thus, reestablishing effective control requires time and a relative degree of stability. 
 As the state and central government have access to state resources and are able to 
receive logistical and military support from other states and organizations, it tends to be 
better equipped than the separatists. Yet, as the case of Eritrea demonstrates, this support 
may backfire if the host state troops are poorly trained or disciplined, and are captured by 
or defect to the separatist. The capacity of a secession to survive and defeat the forces of 
the central government relies upon support networks, such as a Diaspora, through which 
separatists are able to acquire supplies and assistance. For example, significant food aid 
was provided by religious organizations to separatists during the conflicts in Nigeria and 
Sudan (Natsios 172). Thus, whether or not a secession possesses a support network is 
important in determining its longevity and fate. 
 These factors then tie into the fourth and fifth significant elements, the intensity of 
the conflict, and its duration. A high intensity conflict incentivizes internal and external 
actors to directly or indirectly intervene to end the secession, due to the debilitating 
economic and human cost, as well as the effect the conflict has on the stability of the 
government and the rest of a state. Protracted conflicts tend to have residual effects that 
may induce subsequent cycles of violence. The duration of a conflict commonly relates to 
its intensity (though if a state is unable or unwilling to suppress the separatists then the 
two may not be related). In both Katanga and Biafra the conflict was relatively short 
when compared to that of South Sudan and Eritrea. 
Regional Level Factors 
 The effect of a conflict on its surrounding region represents another significant 
factor in the outcome of a secession. The conflicts in Katanga, Biafra, and Somaliland all 
have been relatively contained within the area of the host state. In contrast, the Eritrean 
and South Sudanese cases had large impacts on the stability of the region via generations 
of refugees, the use of neighboring territory as bases, the necessity of border defense, the 
loss of trade and economic growth, and other spillover effects.  
 Regional actors have served key roles in the outcome of a secession through 
provision of material and political support to either the state or the separatist movement. 
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Who regional actors support depends on their relations with the host state, and how the 
outcome of the secession could affect their interests. 
International Level Factors 
 Ultimately, the outcome of a secession is determined at the international level, as 
the present nature of the international system is such that once recognized, and a member 
state of the United Nations, the juridical sovereignty of a state cannot be removed. While 
factors at a local level may determine the longevity of a secessionist movement, and 
regional factors mitigate or reinforce their effect, without recognition as a sovereign state, 
the separatists remain arguably unsuccessful. As discussed in section 5-4, the extension 
of recognition to a separatist entity has potential domestic and international political and 
legal repercussions. Through the case studies, three international factors appear to have 
an influential role in the outcome of a secession. 
 The most fundamental factor is whether or not the separatist entity fulfills the 
basic requirements of statehood, as without these no recognition could be extended. 
Whether or not a secession has a legal claim to independence is also a significant factor. 
Different variations of a legal claim to secession appear in the cases of South Sudan, 
Eritrea, and Somaliland. Finally, other states and non-state actors may be driven by 
benefits that successful secession would bring about; thus whether or not the separatist 
region possesses resources is a potentially significant factor. 
Applying the Framework: Trends and Findings 
When viewed together, we are left with the following list, with the answers being 
yes or no unless indicated otherwise: 
Domestic Factors 
1) Host State Capacity                                                               (Host Capacity) 
2) Exercise of Effective Control by State Over Secessionist Territory                                                       
(                                                                                             (Effective Control) 
3) Presence of a Support Network for Separatists                    (Support Network) 
4) Intensity of Civil War                                                           (Conflict Intensity) 
a. High          b. Low             c. None 
5) Duration of Civil War                                                           (Conflict Duration) 
a. Long          b. Short           c. None 
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Regional Factors 
1) Conflict generated regional external instability                     (External Instability) 
2) Regional Actors Support of Secession                                   (Regional Support) 
a. Yes          b. No         c. Mixed 
International Factors 
1) Does Secession Fulfill the Basic Requirements of Statehood? (Statehood Req.) 
2) Does Secession have Legal Claim?                                           (Legal Claim) 
3) Does Separatist Territory Possess Resources?                          (Resources) 
 
By constructing this list into an investigative framework, they can be applied to all 
of the case studies: 
Determinants of Secession Outcome 
Factors Eritrea South Sudan Somaliland Katanga Biafra 
Host 
Capacity 
Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Effective 
Control 
No No No Yes Yes 
Support 
Network 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Conflict 
Intensity 
High High None High High 
Conflict 
Duration 
Long Long None Short Short 
External 
Instability 
Yes Yes No No No 
Regional 
Support 
Yes Yes Mixed No Mixed 
Statehood 
Requirements 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Legal Claim Yes Yes Yes No No 
Resources Yes* Yes Yes* Yes Yes 
* Indicates non-traditional resources, specifically coastal access and the potential 
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 On the domestic level, where the host state was able to exercise effective control 
over the separatist territory, the secession failed. In all cases except Somaliland, the host 
state was capable of responding to the secession. It should be noted that when the SNM 
pushed for reform of the state, the Somali central government was able to react. The lack 
of state capacity may have enabled Somaliland to continue to exist, however it may also 
explain its lack of success, as the central government is also regarded as legally 
incompetent. The presence of a support network, though varying in form and level of 
strength, does not appear to act as any particular indicator of the outcome of a 
secessionist movement. 
 Cross-analysis of the intensity and duration of a secessionist conflict however, 
reveals a correlation between instances of long, high intensity conflict and successful 
cases of secession in Eritrea and South Sudan. Katanga and Biafra both generated high 
intensity conflicts but only for short periods of time, before being eliminated. Somaliland 
represents an exception, as Somalia has lacked the capacity to oppose it for the duration 
of its declared independence. On the regional level, extending from the nature of the civil 
war, whether or not a secessionist conflict generates external instability also seems to be 
a determinant. Though the separatist conflict in all of the cases had an impact on the 
citizens of the host state and the population residing in the separatist territory, Eritrea and 
South Sudan by nature of their duration and intensity caused significant regional 
instability due to spillover conflict, refugees, and other detrimental effects. Somalia itself 
may still generate regional instability; however its internal struggles are distinct from that 
caused by Somaliland. 
 Regional support does not prove to be of any significance in and of itself. In all of 
the cases the O.A.U. and the A.U. has maintained opposition to the secession, only 
altering its official line after recognition is achieved or after the host state has consented 
to the secession. In both of the exceptions to the norm, no regional actor has extended 
recognition without an internal process allowing for a legal secession. Where regional 
support has been aligned in support of the secession, tracking the support given is a 
difficult task. However, insofar as it indicates the lack of support for the host state by its 
neighbors, regional support will reinforce domestic factors. 
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 Whether or not a secessionist group is able to fulfill the requirements of statehood 
does not offer much insight. Given the highly politicized nature of recognition in relation 
to the requirements of statehood, this is to be expected. That being said, the exceptional 
qualifications of Somaliland appear to be mitigated by other factors, potentially the lack 
of regional or international costs for maintaining the status quo. The presence of a legal 
claim does appear to relate to the outcome of a secession, however Somaliland stands out 
here, having existed as a recognized sovereign state before being illegally absorbed into 
Somalia. The disparity between the strong legal claim of Somaliland and its present lack 
of statehood also seem to point to idea that there is insufficient incentive to make the cost 
of non-recognition exceed the cost of recognition. Both Biafra and Katanga lacked legal 
claims, which undermined their efforts to obtain recognition. 
 Surprisingly, the presence and nature of resources are not, in and of themselves a 
strong predictive or determining element. Both Eritrea and South Sudan possess 
resources (coastal access and oil reserves respectively). However, the presence of similar 
coastal access in Somaliland, an important incentive for nearby landlocked countries, 
undermines non-material resources. On the material side, both Katanga and Biafra 
enclosed major mineral and oil reserves respectively, yet both bids proved unsuccessful. 
The difference between Katanga, Biafra, and South Sudan may rest with their ability to 
survive. In other words, the extension of recognition by states that would benefit was 
withheld due to the possibility of failure. Coastal access is also more dependent on the 
current political dynamic between regional actors, whereas minerals and oil require 
stability and sovereignty to be extracted. 
A Defense of the Research Method 
 The methodology used to identify these factors and in turn formulate a 
hypothesis, is open to criticism—particularly concerns of confirmation bias, or circular 
reasoning. However, this thesis seeks to address a deficit present in current literature on 
the subject, and identify factors that potentially differentiate cases of secession, not to 
explicitly prove one above the others. Undoubtedly, the creation of a theory involves a 
degree of proving the potential validity of the idea, but it is not the same as to prove it 
superior to others, an area where such confirmation bias could undermine the integrity of 
the findings (van Evera 68, 71). These factors are drawn from across the five case studies 
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and then reapplied across all of them, satisfying the need to test the antecedent conditions 
involved (73). 
 Cases of secession may be rare but they have important implications and effects 
on the areas where they occur. Research on the subject is critical for future policy 
evaluation of secessions or even internal conflict. A better understanding of which factors 
are important, and how they interact and affect the actors involved is necessary to 




The principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity delimit the boundaries of the 
international state system and are mechanisms for maintaining stability. Secession 
enables an asymmetrical challenge of these tenets: it pits the stability of the international 
system against the stability of individual states. The international system acts in the 
interest of its own survival, which is apparent in the evolution of international law and its 
capacity to address novel or exceptional threats. Reflecting this reality, it follows that the 
intensity, duration, and external impact of a secessionist conflict are the primary 
determinants of the outcome of a secession. The legal viability of a secession should 
serve as a central factor. However, as comparison of Eritrea and South Sudan with 
Somaliland showed, the strength of a legal claim is dependent on the cost of continued 
conflict outweighing the domestic and international consequences of secession in the 
perspective of external state actors. Beyond their immediate cost, and in contrast to the 
cases of Katanga and Biafra, Eritrea and South Sudan demonstrated both intractability 
and a high probability of continued conflict at a similar or greater cost.  
The opposition of the international community to the practice of secession except 
in the most extreme conditions may discourage potential secessionists and ensure a 
general measure of stability, but it has debilitated the development of consensus on the 
conditions of acceptable secession, and thus minor stability is broadly achieved at the 
cost of major conflict and selective instability. The reluctance of the international 
community to embrace secession is understandable; the relations with existing states and 
their allies are more valuable than those with a non-state actor. Efforts to determine the 
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conditions of secession provoke fears of a slippery slope. This is significant for those 
countries with separatists of their own or those that are more dependent on their juridical 
statehood than their own power to uphold their sovereignty. Yet, as the two exceptions 
have shown, the international system may be forced to come to terms with the necessity 
of a secession when the cost is sufficient and the consent of the host state is given, so 
long as it is judged to be legally competent.  
As it stands, the necessity of a high-cost conflict and consent of the host state 
reflect the operating mentality of the international system and the complexity of the issue 
at hand. Waiting for these conditions to occur is not a viable means of ending or 
preventing instability and conflict. This is because the way a secession ends affects the 
future of participants on all sides (Tir 716–719). As the conflict continues and worsens, 
human and economic costs rise and grievances distill throughout the population, and the 
future of the region is threatened. 
Concern does not rest simply with the actions of the general population, but their 
vulnerability to war rhetoric by their leaders. According to Jaroslav Tir, the leaders of the 
new state and the host state both have incentives to return to war (716–719). The leaders 
of the host state may seek to regain lost territory in order to regain control over natural 
resources, historical purposes, and/or to shore up domestic support (715). The leaders of 
the new state may seek to gain even more territory, as they may have only gained some of 
the territory they had claimed (719). The restart of conflict post-secession is a serious 
problem, as each side is legally able to receive logistical and material aid, and direct 
support from other states (Shaw 1042–3). 
Interdependent economic structures, an expanding regime on the existence of 
human rights, and the potential threat of non-state actors through acts of terrorism and 
other means of non-traditional warfare necessitate a vigilant role for the international 
community in order to maintain stability. Failure to address cases of secession until the 
separatist movement displays its ability to survive enables states to temporarily 
circumvent potential infringements on the sovereignty of others. Yet, the ignorance of the 
international community to the legal basis of the secession, specifically Somaliland, 
undermines the delicate effort to strike a necessary balance.  
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The present lack of procedure and conditions for secession may discourage some 
actors by nature of the difficulty of the process, but can encourage others, as the myth of 
creating homogenous states persists, and the right to self-determination continues to be 
considered a generalized right to secede (Johnson 143–148). Determining the requisite 
conditions for a secession is a necessary step if secession continues to persist in the 
future, and until the right to self-determination no longer appears to be a generalized right 
to secede, it will.  
Granting statehood to Somaliland would engrain basic acceptable conditions for 
secession, and show a differentiation between secessions with a legal basis and those 
without. This initial act would offer a stepping-stone for the system to reconcile the 
matter before it proves more debilitating, and discourage the more opportunity-seeking 
separatists.  
Given the value of sovereignty and the potential for exclusion in any domestic 
power arrangement, separatist movements will persist in their efforts. That being said, it 
is in the interest of the international system to develop a functional framework for 
acceptable secession, without which intractable highly damaging civil wars that bring 
about the consent of the host state will remain the path to statehood, setting up the 
conditions for state failure. 
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